top of page

Part II Mind: Mental Faculties

This is the web page for the Philosophy Part II course Mental Faculties: Intention and the Will given by Cecily Whiteley at the University of Cambridge, Lent Term 2023. This page provides information on the lecture schedule, links to readings, and pdf versions of handouts. If you have any issues accessing any of these materials and/ or general suggestions and comments please drop me an email on cmkw2@cam.ac.uk. I'll be updating this web page periodically as the term progresses. In addition to the readings listed below, the Faculty reading list contains further readings on many of these topics.

The lectures for this course will be taking place at 3-4pm in Room 3, Faculty of Divinity on the Sidgwick Site. This year, the lectures on Mental Faculties: Imagination will be given separately by Alex Fisher in Weeks 4-8. 

Lecture 1: Three Faces of Intention

Handout

Primary: 

  • Setiya, Kieran, "Intention", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition). An excellent introduction to some of the themes we shall be covering in weeks 1-3. 

Further Reading:

  • Ferrero, L. 2017, ‘Intending, Acting, and Doing,’ Philosophical Explorations, 20 (Supplement 2): 13–39.

  • Moran, R. and Stone, M., 2009, ‘Anscombe on Expression of Intention,’ in New Essays on the Explanation of Action, C. Sandis (ed.), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 132–168.

  • Thompson, M., 2008, Life and Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (particularly pp. 91–146).  

The three secondary readings listed here provide opportunity to further explore recent defences of the view that intending is a form of doing. 

Lecture 2: Intention, Belief and Desire

Primary: 

 

Further Reading:

  • Bratman, M. (1999). Davidson's Theory of Intention. In Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy, pp. 209-224). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  Includes critical discussion of the belief-desire model of intention.

  • Marušić, Berislav & Schwenkler, John (2018). Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism. Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340. As the title  suggests, this paper provides further opportunity to explore cognitivism about intention.

  • Ridge, Michael. “Humean Intentions.” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 2, 1998, pp. 157–78.  Defends the view that intentions are predominant desires.

 

Primary:

  • Holton, Richard: Willing, Waiting, Wanting, Chapter 1

 

Further Reading:

  • Bratman, M. 1987, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. The most influential account that treats intentions as sui-generis mental states.

  • Bratman, Michael. “Two Faces of Intention.” The Philosophical Review 93, no. 3 (1984): 375–405. 

Lecture 3: Intentions as Distinctive Practical Attitudes

Lecture 4: Akrasia and Weakness of the Will

Primary:

  • Davidson, Donald (1969). How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press.

 

Further Reading:

  • Holton, Richard (1999). Intention and Weakness of Will. Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.

Lecture 5: Addiction

Primary:

  • Holton, Richard & Berridge, Kent. Addiction Between Compulsion and Choice. In Neil Levy (ed.), Addiction and Self-Control. Oxford University Press.

Further Reading:

  • Pickard, Hannah (2018). 'The puzzle of addiction'. In the Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction.

Lecture 6: Dreaming and the Will I

Primary:

  • Ichikawa, Jonathan (2009). Dreaming and imagination. Mind and Language 24 (1):103-121.

 

Further Reading:

  • Sutton, John (2009). Dreaming. In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.

Lecture 7: Dreaming and the Will II

Primary:

  • Soteriou, Matthew (2020). Dreams, agency, and judgement. Synthese 197 (12):5319-5334.

Further Reading:

Lecture 8: Desire

Primary:

  • Scanlon, T., 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

bottom of page